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A Bargaining Model of Monetary Nonneutrality
Robert Wilson ∗
Summary
Models of bargaining in which prices are negotiated in nom-
inal terms, and one party has superior information about
real terms, have equilibrium outcomes insensitive to this
information. These models illustrate that if negotiations are
conducted in nominal terms then information transmission
can be sticky in the sense used in macroeconomic theories
of sticky prices.
Résumé
Des modèles de négociation dans lesquels les prix sont négo-
ciés en termes nominaux, mais où l’une des parties possède
une information supérieure en termes réels, exhibent à l’équi-
libre des résultats qui restent insensibles à cette information.
Ces modèles illustrent le fait que, si des négociations sont
conduites en termes nominaux, alors la transmission de
l’information peut être « rigide » dans le sens du mot utilisé
dans la théorie macroéconomique des prix rigides.
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1. Introduction
Economic theorists have long found it difficult to address systematically the
empirical fact that monetary policy has real effects. Because the unit of account
or the medium of exchange has no real effect in Walrasian models of general
equilibrium, macroeconomists rely on ad hoc explanations. Some explanations
envision money illusions or non-rational expectations, others suppose that one
or another friction or transaction cost is the source (menu costs, cash in advance
constraints). Most successful are those explanations that assume agents cannot
distinguish statistically between the effects of monetary and real shocks. An
implication of the latter view is that information about monetary conditions
diffuses slowly through the economy (Mankiw and Reis, 2001). To explain “sticky
prices" imperfectly responsive to monetary shocks, Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose
that the cause is “sticky information” about monetary policy. This hypothesis is
vulnerable to the criticism that periodically each central bank publishes ample data
about various categories of the money supply, such as M1 and M2. Nevertheless,
in this paper we examine seriously the hypothesis that sticky information is a
possible explanation.
Our aim is to establish the more fundamental premise that, if bilateral negotia-
tions about transaction prices are conducted in nominal rather than real terms (as
in Yıldız, 2001), and one party (say, the buyer) has some information about the
nominal-to-real conversion ratio, then there is no presumption that the buyer’s
information is conveyed to the seller during the bargaining — that is, information
diffusion can stop at the buyer. We analyze various simple models of bargain-
ing in nominal terms and show that their sequential equilibria entail “pooling";
that is, the resulting price is unaffected by the information known to the buyer.
These models illustrate that negotiations in nominal terms are severely affected
by asymmetric information about the purchasing power of money. The peculiar
role of the nominal-to-real conversion ratio is an instance of the more general
role of asymmetric information about the quality of a good traded in a “lemons"
market afflicted with adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; Vincent, 1989), but our
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results differ in that asymmetric information affects the real terms of trade without
diminishing the likelihood of trade. Thus the consequences are distributional.
We focus on monetary inflation to simplify. We adopt the view that the
effect of monetary expansion, undertaken secretly by the central bank, is to make
money available to a sequence of borrowers, who then use the money to make
purchases. Each borrower who obtains a loan therefore obtains also a small sample
of information about the subsequent general price level. In open market operations,
for instance, the central bank buys government bonds from sellers who then
deposit money in commercial banks. These banks loan money to developers of real
projects, who use the money to buy labor or other resources from sellers, who in
turn also deposit money in banks, and so on, until eventually the money returns
to the central bank when it is deposited in a commercial bank’s reserve account.
In this process of circulation, each seller, bank, or borrower might interpret its
receipt of money as a signal that perhaps the central bank is expanding the money
supply. The concerns of lenders and borrowers, and of buyers and sellers, about
this possibility are opposite: a borrower can later repay a load with inflated money,
a seller is apprehensive that the purchasing power of the money received might
decline.
Even when each borrower’s iota of information is minuscule, if his information
were invariably conveyed to sellers during price negotiations, then it could soon
become widely known among all market participants that the central bank is
expanding the money supply. That is, in every transaction the nominal price would
reflect the totality of all information in the economy about the money supply,
and thus about prospects for inflation. In this scenario, nominal prices would be
flexible — not sticky — responding quickly to the aggregate of all information
in the economy about the real purchasing power of money. This scenario has
substantial support in the large literature on rational expectations models in which
some or all of the private information initially dispersed among traders is revealed
in the clearing prices of markets with multilateral trading.
But here we explore the alternative scenario in which transactions are concluded
by many distinct pairs of buyers and sellers who negotiate bilaterally. We examine
whether there is a similarly strong presumption in this context that a buyer’s bit
of information about the purchasing power of money is revealed, even partially,
in the price resulting from negotiations with a seller. We find that the answer is
no. The failure of information transmission in individual negotiations raises doubt
that quick and reliable information aggregation could be a robust feature on the
larger scale of a national economy. Indeed, the bargaining models studied here at
the microeconomic level provide elementary building blocks for theories of sticky
information and thus sticky prices at the macroeconomic level. These models do
not clarify why prices are negotiated in nominal terms, but they do suggest that
negotiations in nominal terms are peculiarly susceptible to stickiness. This supports
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the general observation that an advantage of stability of the money supply, as in
natural rate theories, is that it facilitates negotiations in nominal terms.
Section 2 establishes the ingredients of the formulation. Section 3 uses the
methodology of efficient mechanism design to establish a general result. Sections
4, 5, and 6 obtain more detailed results by studying the equilibria of bargaining
games having formal procedural rules. Section 7 concludes.
2. Formulation
To focus on the main issue, we study a single negotiation between a seller
and a buyer. Neither party is risk averse and neither has any private information
affecting his or the other’s valuation of trade in real terms. Therefore, in real terms
the gain from trade is normalized to be 1: the seller’s cost is 0 and the buyer’s
valuation is 1. We make no particular assumption about how this gain from trade
is obtained; e.g., it might result from sale of a single item, or of multiple items
or multiple units of a commodity. As in many standard bargaining models, each
party’s impatience for a deal is represented by discounting the delayed gain from
trade by a discount factor δ per period between offers, where 0 < δ < 1.
The parties negotiate in nominal terms, so if they agree on a nominal price
p at time t ∈ {0,1, . . . ,T} then the net payoffs to the seller and the buyer are prδt
and [1–pr]δt , respectively, or their payoffs are both zero if they never agree. A
key feature of this specification is the parameter r that is the conversion factor
from nominal amounts to real amounts; that is, r is the reciprocal of the general
price level, or more generally, r = E[1/P | H ] is the conditional expectation of the
reciprocal of an index P of purchasing power based on their combined information
symbolized by H . The second key feature is our assumption that the buyer
knows the realization of the conversion factor r but the seller knows only that the
cumulative probability distribution function of r is F. We refer to r as the buyer’s
type. Assume that F has a positive density function f on an interval (a,b), where
0 ≤ a < b.
To obtain clear-cut results we impose regularity assumptions on F. For y in the
interval (x,b) define
H(x,y) =
∫ y
x
r dF(r) and G(x,y) = [1/y]
∫ y
x
r dF(r) .
In Section 3 we assume that H is a strictly convex function of y. In Sections 4 and
5 we impose the alternative assumption that G(x,y) is a strictly increasing function
of y. Both these assumptions are satisfied if F is strictly convex, but convexity is
much stronger than necessary; e.g., if F(r) = rα then α > 0 suffices. For purposes of
studying inflation, convexity is relevant because typically one supposes that the
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density f is increasing on the unit interval to convey that small inflation (r ≈ b = 1)
is more likely than large inflation (r ≈ a = 0). For purposes of interpreting the
seller’s risk that payment is received in inflated money, it is often convenient to
suppose that b = 1 is the upper bound of the nominal-to-real conversion rate r.
3. A General Result
Our first indication that little or no information transmission occurs is obtained
as a corollary of the following general result derived via the method of mechanism
design.
Proposition 3.1 – If H(x,y) is strictly convex in y then every trading mecha-
nism that is efficient subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints requires either immediate trade (t = 0) or no trade (t =∞).
Proof. Assume that a trading mechanism produces trade at the price p(r) at
time t(r) if the buyer’s type is r. In the direct revelation game induced by this
mechanism, if the buyer reports his type as s when his true type is r then his payoff
is
Uˆ (r,s) = δt(s) –p(s)rδt(s) .
Incentive compatibility requires that this payoff is maximized by reporting s = r.
Define U (r) = Uˆ (r, r). Then the envelope theorem implies that U ′(r) = –p(r)δt(r), and
therefore
U (r) =U (b) +
∫ b
r
p(s)δt(s) ds .
Assign welfare weights that are 1 for the seller and w(r) ≥ 0 for the buyer of type r,
and define
W (r) =
∫ r
a
w(s)dF(s) and h(r) = rf (r) +W (r) .
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Then the welfare function maximized by an efficient mechanism can be written
as
W =
∫ b
a
p(r)rδt(r) dF(r) +
∫ b
a
w(r)U (r)dF(r)
=
∫ b
a
p(r)rδt(r) dF(r) +
∫ b
a
w(r)[U (b) +
∫ b
r
p(s)δt(s) ds]dF(r)
=
∫ b
a
[rf (r) +W (r)]p(r)δt(r) dr +W (b)U (b)
= –
∫ b
a
h(r)U ′(r)dr +W (b)U (b)
= –bf (b)U (b) +h(a)U (a) +
∫ b
a
U (r)dh(r) ,
where the last line uses integration by parts. An efficient mechanism maximizes
W subject to the constraint that each U (r) ≥ 0 and U ′(r) ≤ 0. Because H is
strictly convex, rf (r) is strictly increasing, so h is also increasing. Therefore,
the transversality condition yields U (b) = 0, and because U ′ ≤ 0, trade occurs
on an interval (a,r∗) where r∗ is the least r for which the constraint U (r) ≥ 0 is
binding. If t(r∗) > 0 then both constraints at r∗ are relaxed by reducing t(r∗), so
t(r∗) = 0. This being true, if any p(r) < p(r∗) then type r∗ prefers to report s = r,
which violates incentive compatibility, so p(r) = p(r∗) for all r ≤ r∗. Then incentive
compatibility for each type r < r∗ requires t(r) ≤ t(r∗). Therefore, W is maximized
by choosing t(r) = 0 and p(r) = p∗ for every type r in the interval (a,r∗), where the
price p∗ exactly satisfies type r∗’s individual rationality constraint, p∗r∗ = 1. Thus
U (r) = max{0,1– r/r∗} for all r ∈ (a,b), and then substituting this formula into the
last line of the formula for W enables optimization of r∗.
A corollary of Proposition 1 is that from the transaction price p∗ the seller can
infer only that the buyer’s type r lies in the interval (a, r∗) of those types who trade
immediately, or in the complementary interval (r∗,b) comprising those types who
never trade. In subsequent sections we develop further implications in models of
bargaining with explicit procedural rules.
4. A Specific Model of Bargaining
In this section we study the bargaining procedure in which the seller makes
offers repeatedly until the buyer accepts or bargaining expires at a time T , in
which case both parties obtain zero payoffs.
Proposition 4.1 – If G(x,y) is a strictly increasing function of y then the
unique sequential equilibrium outcome is that the parties trade immediately at the
no 17 - 2005 / 2
166
A Bargaining Model of Monetary Nonneutrality
nominal price p = 1/b offered initially by the seller.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of offers allowed. The induction
hypothesis is that, if the support of r is (x,y) where a ≤ x < y ≤ b, then the expected
payoff to the seller is
[1/y]
∫ y
x
r d[F(r) –F(x)]/[F(y) –F(x)] .
First we prove this hypothesis for the case T = 0 in which the seller makes a single
offer. In this case, the buyer of type r accepts the offer p if and only if 1–pr ≥ 0
or r ≤ 1/p. Alternatively, interpreting the seller’s decision variable as the highest
value rˆ of r for which the buyer accepts (i.e., p = 1/rˆ), the seller’s expected profit
can be written as:
[1/rˆ]
∫ rˆ
x
r d[F(r) –F(x)]/[F(y) –F(x)] =G(x, rˆ)/[F(y) –F(x)] .
By assumption, this expected profit increases as rˆ increases up to the maximum y
of the support of r. Thus when T = 0 the optimal offer is p = 1/y, which is surely
accepted by the buyer, and the seller’s expected payoff is as hypothesized. Next
we prove the general case using the assumption that the induction hypothesis is
true when one or more offers remain after the current offer. Again interpreting
the seller’s decision variable as rˆ, namely the highest value of r for which the
buyer accepts the initial offer p, we can write the seller’s expected profit using the
induction hypothesis as
p
∫ rˆ
x
r dF(r) +δ[1/y]
∫ y
rˆ
r dF(r) ,
all divided by [F(y) –F(x)]. In this case the critical value rˆ is determined by the
indifference relation
1–prˆ = δ[1– [1/y]rˆ] ,
since the buyer of type rˆ expects the price 1/y to be offered next period if he
refuses the offer p this period. Using this relation to substitute for p in the profit
expression, we obtain the expected profit entirely in terms of the decision variable
rˆ in the form
[1–δ][1/rˆ]
∫ rˆ
x
r dF(r) +δ[1/y]
∫ y
x
r dF(r) = [1–δ]G(x, rˆ) +δG(x,y) ,
again divided entirely by [F(y) – F(x)]. Because G is increasing in its second
argument, this shows that the optimal choice for the seller is again rˆ = y and thus
p = 1/y, which confirms the induction hypothesis that the seller’s expected profit is
G(x,y)/[F(y) –F(x)] regardless of how many offers remain. Since the bargaining
starts with (x,y) = (a,b) this shows that the outcome is that the initial offer p = 1/b
is surely accepted by the buyer.
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An analog of Proposition 2 is obtained from the alternative assumption that
G(x,y) is a strictly convex function of y. In this version, rˆ is one of the two extreme
points of the interval (x,y), so starting from (a,b) either there is no trade or the
seller offers p = 1/b as in Proposition 2. If G(x,y) is both increasing and convex in
y then H(x,y) is convex, as assumed in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 indicates that information transmission is sticky in two senses.
First, the transaction time and price are independent of the discount factor δ and
the distribution function F, provided only that it satisfies the stated assumption;
thus, it is immaterial how impatient the parties are, and immaterial whether the
buyer’s information is very slight or very precise — all that matters is the upper
bound b of the support of r. Second, from the negotiations the seller infers nothing
about the buyer’s type. Although the seller could screen the buyer’s types with a
series of successively lower prices, and thereby infer r with considerable precision,
the seller ignores this opportunity and accepts the entire risk of receiving inflated
money when r < b.
Is there any incentive for the buyer to reveal information voluntarily? Proposi-
tion 2 shows that the buyer’s profit if he reveals no information is 1– r/b, whereas
if he were to reveal the realization of r to the seller then the equilibrium would
entail an initial offer p = 1/r from the seller that he would accept, yielding a profit
of zero. More generally, any revelation that would enable the seller to truncate the
distribution of r from above (i.e., reduce b to y < b) is disadvantageous to the buyer.
One can plausibly surmise that informative communication might occur in more
elaborate formulations of the bargaining procedure, or in case the seller or the
buyer has additional private information about the gains from trade in real terms.
In the latter case, screening by the seller and/or signaling by the buyer might play
important roles to determine the existence and magnitude of the real gains from
trade, and in the process some of the confounding information of the buyer about
the price level might be revealed. In the example above, however, the existence
and magnitude of the gains from trade in real terms are common knowledge, so
none of these features arise.
In this simple example there are no direct real effects from the possibility
of inflation: trade occurs surely and immediately, as it would if there were no
uncertainty about the price level. In the economy as a whole, however, the real
effects can be substantial. The absence of information transmission from buyer
to seller enables expansion of the money supply to stimulate more transactions
overall by increasing the supply of loanable funds at commercial banks without
inflating transaction prices.
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5. Extension to Alternating Offers
Proposition 2 shows that if only the seller makes offers then her optimal
strategy is always to offer the price 1/b, which all buyer types accept immediately.
If the parties alternate offers then there is a similar equilibrium in which, in the
infinite-horizon case, the seller always offers the nominal price p = 1/b[1 + δ],
the buyer always offers q = δp regardless of his type, and each offer is accepted
immediately by the other party. To see this, observe that given the seller’s strategy,
the buyer has no incentive to offer any price above δp, which the seller is willing
to accept, and any lower price is obviously rejected by the seller. Given the buyer’s
strategy, a modification of the previous argument shows that the seller’s strategy is
optimal. She anticipates that an offer p is accepted if r ≤ rˆ, where 1–prˆ = δ[1 –qrˆ],
and therefore her expected profit can be expressed as
p
∫ rˆ
a
r dF(r) +δq
∫ b
rˆ
r dF(r) = [1–δ]G(a, rˆ) +δqG(a,b) .
Because G is increasing in its second argument, her optimal choice is rˆ = b. The
two equations that determine p and q are therefore that (a) 1–pb = δ[1 –qb] so that
the buyer of type b is indifferent about accepting p, and (b) q = δp so that the seller
is indifferent about accepting q; together these imply that p = 1/b[1+δ] as claimed
above. Thus in the case of alternating offers there is an equilibrium in which none
of the buyer’s information is revealed by the outcome of bargaining.
If the number of offers is finite then a pooling equilibrium, analogous to the
one described above for the infinite-horizon case, is the only sequential equilibrium
that satisfies some selection criterion, such as in Grossman and Perry (1986). These
criteria typically exclude sequential equilibria in which the seller rejects a pooling
offer from the buyer that provides at least her profit in the continuation game.
Suppose the seller makes the final offer in period T if negotiations last that long.
As we have seen, in period T she offers p = 1/y if the current support of r is (x,y),
and this price is surely accepted by the buyer. In period T –1, therefore, the buyer’s
optimal offer is the pooling offer q = δ/y, independently of his type, since any
lesser price is rejected by the seller, and according to the selection criterion, this
price is accepted by the seller. Anticipating this in period T –2, the seller’s optimal
offer is p = [1–δ+δ2]/y, corresponding to rˆ = y; so again in period T –3, the buyer’s
optimal offer q = δp is pooling. Continuing in this fashion, we see that in every
period a pooling offer is made and surely accepted. As the number of periods
remaining increases, the two parties’ offers converge to the ones shown above
to be equilibrium offers in the infinite-horizon case. Thus, the only sequential
equilibrium outcome is that they trade immediately, although the price depends on
the number of offers remaining.
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6. Generalization
In this section we sketch the analysis of a more general case in which we
assume only that, for each x, G(x,y) is a unimodal function of y. In this case, let
η(x) denote the unique value of y that maximizes G(x,y). As in Section 4, assume
that only the seller makes offers, and bargaining ends after time T .
A repetition of the argument in Section 4 shows that in period T , when the
support of the buyer’s type is (x,y) the seller’s expected profit is G(x, rˆ)/[F(y) –F(x)]
if she offers p = 1/rˆ. Hence the optimal offer is 1/η(x). At time T –1, therefore, her
expected profit when the support is (x,y) and she offers nominal price p is
p
∫ rˆ
x
r dF(r) +δ[1/η(rˆ)]
∫ η(rˆ)
rˆ
r dF(r)
divided by [F(y) –F(x)], where the critical rate rˆ satisfies
1–prˆ = δ[1– [1/η(rˆ)]rˆ]
because type rˆ is the one indifferent between the offer p now and the offer 1/η(rˆ)
next period. Using this relation to eliminate p, the expected profit is
[1–δ]G(x, rˆ) +δG(x,η(rˆ))
divided by [F(y) –F(x)]. Recall now that G(rˆ, ·) is maximized at η(rˆ).
7. Discussion
The gist of the example in Sections 4 and 5, given the key assumptions, is
the demonstration that the seller has no incentive to use the negotiation process
to extract information about the purchasing power of the money she receives in
payment — she simply bears the risk that r < b. The net result is that information
transmission from the buyer to the seller about the price level is excluded or muted.
Our assumption in Section 4 that G is increasing in its second argument can be
interpreted essentially as assuming that the seller has no incentive when making
a final offer to run the risk that the offer is rejected. The proof of Proposition
2 then says that if she has no incentive to risk a final rejection then also she
has no incentive to risk rejection earlier. The assumption that she is unwilling to
risk rejection in the final period seems appropriate when considering situations in
which the buyer’s information about the price level does not allow much chance
(for the seller) that expected inflation is severe. On the other hand, our results
depend on the implicit assumption that the real gains from trade are sufficiently
large to outweigh the risk of inflation. If the buyer’s decision were about how
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much (rather than whether) to purchase, then we might expect some information
to be revealed via the buyer’s decision about the quantity to purchase. Similarly,
more information revelation might be possible if the seller deals with many buyers,
and information obtained from one buyer is useful in dealing with others.
The intuitive motivations for these results are fairly evident. The seller is
negotiating for payment in a currency about which she has inferior information.
She therefore faces a severe problem of adverse selection: any price offer is more
likely to be accepted by those buyer types who know that the currency has a low
real value. On the other hand, she knows that there is gain from trade in real terms.
Under the circumstances, her best strategy is to make an offer that surely realizes
the real gains from trade and then to bear the risk that the currency is inflated.
The substance of our key assumptions is to assure that this risk is less important
than assuring early realization of the gain from trade.
Regarding theories of sticky prices, we take the example as indicative that there
is no presumption that information about the money supply gets revealed in any
single bilateral negotiation. This indicates that one cannot expect information
dispersed among many bargaining relationships to be reflected in prices. Therefore,
sticky information transmission could indeed be a source of the effectiveness of
monetary expansion in stimulating real activity.
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